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Summary
This report describes safeguards implementation in Finland in 2003. The report covers
the legal basis for safeguards, activities of license holders, the inventories of the nuclear
materials, the inspections performed by STUK, the International Atomic Energy Agency,
IAEA, and the European Union and finally, the statement of the Finnish nuclear safe-
guards during the year 2003.
KARILA Kauko (ed.). Nuclear Safeguards in Finland 2003. STUK-B-YTO 231. Helsinki 2004.
25 pp. + Annexes 3 pp.
Keywords: non-proliferation, nuclear materials, safeguards, illicit trafficking,
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1 IntroductionThe peaceful use of nuclear materials has to be
guaranteed by the most credible way. The nation-
al nuclear safeguards system has been established
for this purpose: to ensure that the nuclear mate-
rials, equipment and technology are used only for
the declared, peaceful purposes. The national safe-
guards system cooperates with the EU regional
safeguards system (DG TREN – Safeguards and
Non-Proliferation) and with the IAEA.
The Finnish safeguards system comprises the
authorities and licence-holders. Functioning of
the national system is subject to international
controls. Undistributed responsibility on safety,
security and safeguarding of its nuclear materialsis on the licence holder. It is the responsibility of
the competent state authority to ensure that the
licence-holders comply with the requirements of
the safeguards agreement.
Nuclear materials safeguards apply to:
• nuclear materials (special fissionable material
and source material)
• other nuclear items (components, equipment,
materials suitable for producing nuclear ener-
gy or for nuclear weapons, agreements and
technology)
• licence-holders’ activities, expertise, prepared-
ness and competence.5
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2 Finnish national safeguards system2.1 Legal basis
The basis of the national safeguards is comprised
of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree
(http://www.stuk.fi/english/regulations/). By vir-
tue of the Act STUK issues detailed regulations
(YVL Guides) that apply to the safe use of nuclear
energy. (http://www.stuk.fi/english/publications/
yvl-guides.html). The main guides related to safe-
guards are:
• Control of nuclear fuel and other nuclear ma-
terials required in the operation of nuclear
power plants (Guide YVL 6.1)
• The national system of accounting for and
control of nuclear materials (Guide YVL 6.9)
and
• Reports to be submitted on nuclear materials
(Guide YVL 6.10).
Finland was the first state where the INFCIRC/
153-type safeguards agreement with the IAEA en-
tered into force (INFCIRC/155, February 9, 1972).
This agreement was suspended after Finland
joined to the European Union and the agreement
between the non-nuclear weapon States of the
EU, Euratom and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) en-
tered into force in Finland on October 4, 1995.
The national safeguards system was main-
tained after Finland joined the EU and to the
Euratom safeguards system on January 1, 1995.
The basic motivation for maintaining the national
system has to do with the responsibilities as-
sumed by the state following the NPT. The
Euratom safeguards is based on the Euratom
Treaty and the Commission Regulation No. 3227/
76, as amended.
Finland signed the Additional Protocol in Vi-
enna, 22 September 1998, with the other EU
member states and ratified it in August 2000. The
AP entered into force in April 2004 after all the
EU countries ratified it.
Finland has several bilateral agreements in6the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Upon
joining to the EU, the agreements with Australia,
Canada and the USA were partly substituted by
the Euratom agreements with these states. Also
the agreements with Sweden and the UK have
partly been expired. The old agreement made
with the Soviet Union was continued for five
years in 1999 and the negotiations with the
Russian Federation about new agreement are
now underway.
2.2 Parties of the Finnish safeguards
system
2.2.1 Ministries
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for
non-proliferation policy and the international
agreements. The Ministry of Trade and Industry
is responsible for highest management and con-
trol of nuclear energy in Finland. It is responsible
for legislation related to nuclear energy and it is
also the competent safeguards authority men-
tioned in the Euratom Treaty. Also other minis-
tries, such as the Ministry of the Interior and the
Ministry of Defence are contributing to the effi-
cient function of the system.
2.2.2 STUK
According to the Finnish nuclear legislation,
STUK is responsible to maintain the national
safeguards system in order to prevent the prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons. It regulates the li-
cense-holders’ activities and ensures that the ob-
ligations of international agreements concerning
peaceful use of nuclear material are met. Regula-
tory control of STUK is directed at the posses-
sion, manufacture, production, transfer, handling,
use, storage, transport, export and import of nu-
clear material and other nuclear items.
STUK takes care of the approval of the IAEA
and Euratom inspectors for Finland. STUK shall
S T U K - B - Y T O 2 3 1approve an inspector if his activities are not
considered to endanger the safe use of nuclear
energy or the prevention of the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. If it can not approve an inspec-
tor, STUK shall assign the approval to the Minis-
try of Trade and Industry.
The safeguards implementation by STUK cov-
ers all the typical measures of the State System of
Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials
(SSAC). In addition, STUK has its own independ-
ent audit and verification programme particular-
ly for the spent nuclear fuel to ensure the com-
pleteness and correctness of the operator data.
The safeguards implementation in national level
is closely linked with other functions like export/
import control, customs and border control, trans-
port safety, illicit trafficking, physical protection
and certain measures of the Comprehensive Nu-
clear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The transportation of nuclear and other radio-
active materials are very closely linked to the
safeguards objectives. In Finland, STUK’s safe-
guards section is responsible to regulate the radi-
oactive material transportations and acceptance
of the transport packages. Finland, being the
eastern border of the EU, has a very important
role taking care of the prevention of illicit traf-
ficking of nuclear materials. STUK cooperatesFig. 1. The organization of STUK.
Director General
Jukka Laaksonen
Nuclear Waste and Materials 
Regulation
Directors
Public 
Information
Emergency 
Preparedness
Expert Services
Non-Ionising Radiation 
Surveillance
Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Radiation Practices Regulation
Research and Environmental 
Surveillance
Director
ArjaTanninen
Management Support
Regulation of Nuclear Waste
Regulation of Nuclear Materials
Section Head 
National Data Centre for 
Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Elina Martikka
Administration and Internal Servicesvery closely with the Finnish Customs and offers
its expertise to develop the monitoring of radioac-
tive materials on the borders, and also to train
the Custom officers.
At STUK, the safeguards section is a part of
the Nuclear Waste and Materials Regulation De-
partment, with 21 staff members. See organiza-
tion chart, Fig. 1. The duties of the department
are in the following: nuclear waste management,
national data centre for the CTBT (Comprehen-
sive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) and nuclear mate-
rials regulation including transportation of radio-
active materials. The director of the department
is Mrs Arja Tanninen. She has an administrative
staff dealing with safeguards. Mr Juha Rautjärvi
is a coordinator of the co-operation programme
for the Russian Federation. He is also contribut-
ing to the non-proliferation issues. Mrs Erja Kai-
nulainen is the coordinator of the Finnish Sup-
port Programme to the IAEA safeguards and is
responsible for licensing of nuclear materials and
other nuclear goods.
Six full time experts are working in the nucle-
ar materials section:
• Mrs Elina Martikka, Section Head (national
system, Additional Protocol (AP) implementa-
tion)
• Mr Tapani Honkamaa, Senior Inspector (Non-
Destructive Analysis (NDA), final disposal)
• Mr Marko Hämäläinen, Inspector (inspections,
AP implementation)
• Mr Kauko Karila, Inspector (reporting, docu-
mentation)
• Mr Olli Okko, Senior Inspector (research and
development (R&D), final disposal)
• Mr Jaakko Tikkinen, Senior Inspector (tran-
sportation, illicit trafficking).7
Fig. 2. Staff of Nuclear Materials Regulation 2003.
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The last but not the least parties in the safe-
guards system are the operators. The operators
have the core of the State’s safeguards system
concerning the facility level nuclear material ac-
countancy and control with the authentic source8data of the nuclear materials. The operators have
to prepare the Nuclear Material Handbooks cov-
ering all the information how the safeguards in
that individual facility is carried. The Handbook,
which is also the part of the quality system, is
accepted by STUK.
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3 Themes of the year3.1 The Additional Protocol (AP)
Finland signed the Additional Protocol in Vienna,
22 September 1998, with the other EU countries
and ratified it in August 2000.The AP will enter
into force after all the EU countries have ratified
it. Italy and Ireland ratified the AP in the end of
the year 2003. The extended work of updating the
Euratom Safeguards Regulation, which gives the
legal basis for the Commission to carry out its
responsibilities defined in the AP, has been fin-
ished in the Atomic Questions Group (AQG) in
March, 2004. The AP came into force on 30 April
2004. STUK has actively taken part to the experts
meeting dealing with the AP - the AQG, the IAEA
technical meetings and the ES meetings organ-
ised for the Member States. Also a field trial with
the IAEA, the Euratom Safeguards (ES), the
Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT) and
STUK was performed during 2000–2003 in order
to test the AP implementation procedure in prac-
tise. The final report of the field trial was conclud-
ed in September 2003.3.2 Safeguards for final disposal
Finland has decided that all spent nuclear fuel
produced in Finnish power plants will be disposed
in the Finnish bedrock. After careful studies,
Olkiluoto in the Eurajoki municipality was cho-
sen as a possible site for final geological reposi-
tory of spent nuclear fuel. The nuclear waste com-
pany, Posiva, will perform all necessary tasks and
activities to ensure the safe construction of the
repository. It is very important to determine the
requirements of the safeguards in time – includ-
ing also the international (IAEA and EU) require-
ments. In July 2004, the first concrete step in the
Finnish final repository will be taken. The exca-
vation of the research and development tunnel,
ONKALO, will start. The ONKALO most probably
will be a part of the final repository in the future.
STUK has organised and participated actively the
technical meetings with the IAEA, the EU and
other states interested in the final disposal. STUK
sent a letter to the Director General of the IAEA
late in 2003, providing at this early state informa-
tion about the project and inviting the IAEA to
establish an initial knowledge base and start its
implementation and R&D activity as considered
necessary.9
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4 Safeguards implementationMost of the nuclear material in Finland (see Fig.
3 and 4) is used as a fuel for the Finnish nuclear
power plants (NPPs). The main areas relevant to
the nuclear materials safeguards during 2003
were the supply of the nuclear fuel, import, trans-
portation, storing, handling and use of it. The
decision to build the fifth Finnish power reactor
in the Olkiluoto NPP area, beginning in 2005, has10
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Fig. 3. Uranium amount in Finnish nuclear power plan
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Fig. 4. Plutonium amount in Finnish nuclear power plalso been taken into account in the plans of the
next year’s safeguards activities.
4.1 The Loviisa NPP
Fortum is one of the biggest energy companies in
Scandinavia. In the past, Fortum was a state-
owned company formed from comprised of Imat-
ran Voima and Neste. Fortum has electric power8 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
ts in 1990–2003.
8 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
ants in 1990–2003.
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To From FA LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
W0L1 Germany 118 20 467 —
W0L2 Spain 118 19 964 —
W0LS W0L2 164 27 842 247
WL0V Russia 90 10 791 —
Spain 102 12 781  —
W0L1, W0L2 & W0LS = Olkiluoto NPP
WL0V = Loviisa NPP
FA = fuel assembly; LEU = Low-enriched uranium
Table I. Summary of nuclear materials receipts and
shipments in 2003.plants of many types: nuclear, gas, coal, oil, among
others. The nuclear power plant of Fortum Power
and Heat is located in Loviisa in eastern Finland,
where there are two nuclear power reactor units
with common spent fuel storages (material bal-
ance area WLOV). The electricity generated in
Loviisa NPP – ca. 10% of the whole electricity
production in Finland – is used as a primal supply
source in Finnish electrical network.
Fortum has earlier purchased the fuel for
reactor units Loviisa 1 and 2 mainly from the
Russian Federation as complete assemblies. Now-
adays about half of the fuel assemblies are im-
ported from the Russian Federation and the re-
maining half from Spain. The most of uranium is
of Russian origin. Until 1996 the spent fuel was
returned back to the Russian Federation. Due to
the change in the Finnish nuclear legislation the
spent fuel has been stored in the interim storage
since 1996.
In 2003, STUK granted Fortum a licence con-
cerning the export of three spent fuel rods for
inspection and research to Studsvik, Sweden.
Based on earlier granted licence totally 192 fuel
assemblies containing 23.6 tons of uranium were
imported to Loviisa NPP: 90 fuel assemblies (av-
erage uranium enrichment 4%) from the Russian
Federation and 102 fuel assemblies (3.7%) from
Spain. The receipts of fuel assemblies are stated
in Table I.
Loviisa 1 refuelling and maintaining outage
was performed in August 2–25, 2003 and for
Loviisa 2 in August 23 – September 9, 2003. In
Loviisa 1 refuelling, 108 fresh fuel assemblies
were loaded into the core, whereas in Loviisa 2
refuelling, 102 fresh fuel assemblies and 12 spent
fuel assemblies were loaded into the core. Before
closing of each of the reactors STUK, the IAEA
and the ES identified the fuel assemblies in the
reactor cores and verified the fuel assemblies in
loading ponds. Loviisa 1 was inspected on August
10, 2003 and Loviisa 2 on August 30, 2003. Five
routine inspections were performed together with
the IAEA and the ES in January, April, July,
September and December. In addition, STUK
made one inspection concerning nuclear equip-
ment and other items and three inspections con-
cerning fuel assemblies which were opened for
operation research purposes. During the routine
inspection in September 2003, the IAEA and theES also measured dummy elements in Loviisa
spent fuel storages. STUK’s measurements in
Loviisa are reported in Chapter 4.8.
Fortum reported to STUK about its interna-
tional fuel contracts, fuel transfers and ship-
ments. On the basis of its verification and assess-
ment, STUK has concluded that Fortum has
complied with its safeguards obligations.
4.2 The Olkiluoto NPP
Teollisuuden Voima (TVO) is a private company
owned by Finnish industrial and power compa-
nies to whom it provides electricity at cost price.
TVO owns and operates two nuclear power plant
units and a interim spent fuel storage in Olkiluo-
to, in the municipality of Eurajoki on the west
coast of Finland. Olkiluoto NPP produces ca. 16%
of whole electricity production in Finland. In
Olkiluoto there are three material balance areas
(W0L1, W0L2 and W0LS).
TVO uses uranium of Australian, Canadian,
Russian and Chinese origin. Uranium is enriched
in the Russian Federation or in the EU. The fuel
assemblies are manufactured in Germany, Spain
and Sweden.
In 2003, STUK granted to TVO four licences
for importing nuclear fuel. Totally 236 fuel assem-
blies containing 40.4 tons of uranium (3.2%) were
imported to Olkiluoto NPP, 114 fuel assemblies
from Germany and 118 from Spain. The receipts
and shipments of fuel assemblies are stated in
Table I. STUK also granted TVO one license to
export samples of spent fuel to Sweden, two
import licenses for control rods, one import li-
cense for core loading software and one posses-
sion/operation license for depleted uranium sam-
ples.11
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MBA FA/SFA *) LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
WL0V 3515/2774 405 597 3224
W0L1 1330/746 224 771 1089
W0L2 1206/612 207 057 936
W0LS 4428/4428 755 326 6150
MBA = material balance area, FA = fuel assembly,
SFA = spent fuel assembly
*) FAs in core are accounted as fresh fuel assemblies
(Loviisa 313 FAs and Olkiluoto 500 FAs per reactor).
Table II. Fuel assemblies in nuclear power plants
on December 31, 2003.Olkiluoto 1 refuelling and maintaining outage
was performed in May 27 – June 6, 2003 and
Olkiluoto 2 in May 11–26, 2003. In Olkiluoto 1
refuelling, 130 fresh fuel assemblies and in Olki-
luoto 2 refuelling, 128 fresh fuel assemblies were
loaded into the core. Before each of the reactors
was closed STUK, the IAEA and the ES identified
the fuel assemblies in the reactor cores and
verified the fuel assemblies in loading ponds.
Olkiluoto 1 was inspected on June 3, 2003 and
Olkiluoto 2 on May 23, 2003. STUK, the IAEA
and the ES verified the inventory in Olkiluoto
Spent Fuel Storage on September 10, 2003. Five
routine inspections were performed by STUK, the
IAEA and the ES (for each MBAs) in Olkiluoto: in
January, April, July, September and December
2003. In addition, STUK made one inspection
concerning nuclear equipment and other nuclear12
MBA U-Natural (kg) U-Enriched (kg) U-
WL0V — 405 597
W0L1 — 224 771
W0L2 — 207 057
W0LS — 755 326
WRRF 1 511 60.1
WFRS 45 1.4
WKK0  712.6 —
WHEL 39 2
Others* < 1 kg —
WRRF = VTT FiR-1/VTT Processes; WFRS = STUK; WKK0 = OMG Kokkola C
WHEL = Helsinki University’s laboratory of radiochemistry.
* Others means the small laboratories and minor NM holders listed in Tab
Table III. Nuclear material amounts in Finland on Decitems. STUK’s measurements in Olkiluoto are
reported in Chapter 4.8.
TVO reported to STUK about its international
fuel contracts, fuel transfers and shipments. On
the basis of its verification and assessment, STUK
has concluded that TVO has complied with its
safeguards obligations..
4.3 VTT FiR 1 -research reactor
Small amounts of nuclear materials are located
on other facilities than nuclear power plants. The
most significant of those is VTT research reactor
(MBA WRRF) in Otaniemi, Espoo. STUK, IAEA
and ES verified the nuclear material inventory of
VTT on 5 June, 2003. The nuclear material inven-
tory was found to be correct and the nuclear ma-
terial accountancy and control functions accepta-
bly performed by VTT. The inventory of nuclear
materials in the end of 2003 is presented in
Table III.
4.4 Minor nuclear material holders
The location outside facilities are STUK (WFRS),
the Laboratory of Radiochemistry at Helsinki
University (WHEL) and OMG Kokkola Chemicals
(WKK0).
STUK’s nuclear activities are mainly storing of
nuclear materials. STUK has the Central Interim
Storage for Small-User Radioactive Waste
(“Small-Waste Storage”) located in the NPP waste
cave in Olkiluoto and the small radionuclideDepleted (kg) Plutonium (kg) Thorium (kg)
— 3 224 —
— 1 089 —
— 936 —
— 6 150 —
2 — —
347 0.003 2.5
— — —
20 0.003 1.9
540 < 1 kg —
hemicals;
le IV
ember 31, 2003.
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Company
Nuclear material (kg)
MBA + use of NMU-dep U-nat U-Leu U-Heu Pu Th
University of Helsinki/
Dept. of Physics
SF 0291 CA, NM activities finished
VTT Industrial Systems SF 0292 CA, NM activities finished
Geological Survey of Finland 
(GTK)
0.00174 SF 0293 CA, Minor NM activities
Finnair Engineering 15.5 SF 0302 CA, U-dep radiation shielding
Rautaruukki, Raahe Works 264 SF 0303 CA, U-dep radiation shielding
Inspecta 304 SF 0304 CA,  U-dep radiation shielding
Outokumpu Stainless 100.98 U-dep radiation shielding
Centre for Technical Training, 
Metal and machinery
15 U-dep radiation shielding
Polartest 163.2 U-dep radiation shielding
MAP Medical Technologies 55 U-dep radiation shielding
Metorex International 0.0105 U-nat standards
Defence forces 0.00015 Pu used in gas detectors
Table IV. Amounts of nuclear material at minor nuclear material holders.storage at STUK. The inventory was verified by
the IAEA and the ES on September 3, 2003.
At moment the Laboratory of Radiochemistry
of Helsinki University has no nuclear activities
excluding store of minor amount of nuclear mate-
rial. Anyhow it is possible that they will continue
the research work with nuclear materials in the
future. The inventory of Laboratory was verified
by STUK, the IAEA and the ES on September 3,
2003.
The only activity of OMG Kokkola Chemicals
concerning nuclear materials is to process side
products. While obtaining clean cobalt, they are
getting sodium uranate solution among other
substances. This sodium uranate solution has
been timely shipped to Comurhex in France.
OMG Kokkola Chemicals has an operation license
to store max 20 000 kg of uranium in this solu-
tion. STUK made the inspection on MBA WKK0
on July 15, 2003 and the inventory was verified
by STUK, the IAEA and the ES on September 4,
2003.
In 2003, STUK sent a specific inquiry of nucle-
ar material and its use to 17 potential small
nuclear material holders: 10 of these had some,
mostly exempted nuclear material. Almost all of
them have nuclear materials in the form of de-
pleted uranium shielding. Only two holders, Geo-
logical Survey of Finland (GTK) and Metorex
International have some other nuclear materials.
GTK has ca. 1.17 g of HEU to use as a spikematerial in geological studies and for mass spec-
trometry calibrations. The operation license con-
cerning the use of high enriched uranium, the
maximum amount being 1.5 g (0.8 g of U-235),
were granted to GTK for the next 10 years.
Metorex has ca. 10 g of natural uranium that
they use as calibration material for radiation
monitoring gates. A list of minor nuclear material
holders including close down locations is present-
ed in Table IV.
4.5 Other nuclear items
The Finnish Nuclear Energy legislation regulates
also other nuclear items than nuclear material.
Import and export of heavy water requires a li-
cence or at least a notification to STUK. In 2003,
STUK gave a statement to the Ministry of Trade
and Industry about the license application of Sig-
ma Aldrich/YA Kemia to export deuterium com-
pounds to Estonia and the Ministry granted the
license. STUK also received one notice from YA
Kemia concerning transfer of deuterium solution
inside Finland.
4.6 IAEA safeguards
The IAEA safeguards in Finland is based on the
Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/193) between
the non-nuclear weapon states of the EU, the Eu-
ropean Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and
the IAEA. The IAEA and Euratom Safeguards
(ES) have agreed on cooperation (New Partner-13
S T U K - B - Y T O 2 3 1ship Approach, NPA) with the aim of reducing the
undue duplication of effort. In Finland this has
not decreased the number of inspection days.
There is still overlap with the ES and IAEA activ-
ities. In 2003 the IAEA safeguards activities were
carried out without significant changes compared
with the previous year.
The facility attachments (FA) according to the
Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/193) were not
in force in 2003 in Finland. This situation is not
appreciated but it has not negatively influenced
the implementation.
STUK has sent the requests of the new IAEA
inspector candidates for comments to the largest
nuclear material holders. No remarks were made
and STUK accepted all the proposed inspector
candidates. In 2003, altogether 23 new IAEA
inspectors were accepted to inspect Finnish nu-
clear installations. There were a total of 139 IAEA
inspectors that had the right of inspection in
Finland on December 31, 2003.
STUK has received 24 statements by IAEA
concerning the inspections during the year 2003.
One statement of the inspection carried out dur-
ing the year 2003 is not yet received when writing
this (June 2004). There were no remarks about
the outstanding questions in the statements.
4.7 Euratom Safeguards (ES)
The Treaty of the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (Euratom Treaty) and the EU Safeguards14Regulation (3227/76) based on the Treaty form
the foundation for the Euratom safeguards. Nu-
clear material holders and producers of ores that
contain uranium or thorium have the responsibil-
ity to maintain the nuclear material accountancy
system and submit reports and other data to the
ES in Luxembourg. The copies of the reports and
other data have to be sent to STUK.
Based on Basic Technical Characteristics pro-
vided by the operators the ES prepares particular
safeguards provisions (PSPs) for each material
balance area. For the Loviisa NPP and the VTT
Research reactor (FiR 1 -reactor) the PSPs came
into force in 1998. The ES has asked for and got
the comments on the PSPs from STUK and TVO
in 2001, but the PSPs concerning the Olkiluoto
NPP are still under preparation.
STUK has sent the requests of the new ES
proposed inspector candidates for comments to
the largest nuclear material holders. No remarks
were made. In 2003, altogether 9 new ES inspec-
tors were declared to inspect Finnish nuclear
installations. There were a total of 211 ES inspec-
tors that had the right of inspection in Finland on
December 31, 2003.
The IAEA statements has been circulated via
the Euratom safeguards, and the ES had amend-
ed their own conclusions about the inspections to
the statements before providing them to the State.
The conclusions by the ES were in line with the
IAEA remarks – no outstanding questions.
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Fig. 6. Number of inspection man-days during inspections carried out by the ES, the IAEA and STUK
at Finnish Facilities 1997–2003.
* The numbers of inspections and man-days have been calculated comparable with the IAEA and
the ES numbers since 1997.
Fig. 5. Number of inspections carried out by the ES, the IAEA and STUK at Finnish Facilities 1997–2003.
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Method Charasteristics Note
1 GBUV (Gamma Burn-
Up Verifier)
Portable, relative eff. 20%,  HPGe (High Purity 
Germanium detector) placed behind 3 mm slit in 
spent fuel pool.
Only Olkiluoto has slits in the pool walls. 
2 EFORK (enhanced 
FORK detector)
Traditional FORK (Neu-tron/Gamma Ray Verification) 
equipped with 20 mm³ CdZnTe spectrometer
Transferable. Can be used in Olkiluoto and 
Loviisa. 
3 Olkiluoto SFAT (Spent 
Fuel Attribute Tester)
Completely underwater (NaI detector inside 
watertight cover). Moving telescope.
Operation with Olkiluoto fuel transfer 
machine.
4 Loviisa SFAT (new 
storage)
Completely underwater (detec-tor inside watertight 
cover). No moving parts inside.
Operation with Loviisa fuel transfer machine.
5 Loviisa SFAT (old 
storage)
Pipe and supporting structure. The detector can be 
either 20% HPGe or NaI detector.
Pipe has a holder for sepa-rate detector 
above water level. HPGe or NaI detectors 
have been used.
Table V. STUK’s Non-Destructive Analysis measuring equipment of spent fuel.
Location Date Measuring days
Measured 
assemblies
Verification method 
(see Table V)
Loviisa KPA 04/2003 2 329 SFAT (4)
Olkiluoto KPA 06/2003 2 14 GBUV (1)
Olkiluoto KPA 09/2003 1 62 SFAT (3)
Loviisa KPA 12/2003 2 20 EFORK (2)
Table VI. STUK’s spent fuel measurements in 2003.4.8 STUK’s spent fuel verifications
STUK has developed Non-Destructive Analysis
(NDA) measurement systems for several years. At
the moment it has a regular programme to meas-
ure spent nuclear fuel at both nuclear power
plants. The purpose is to verify the operator’s nu-
clear material data including burn-up calcula-
tions. Depending on local circumstances a bit dif-
ferent methods is used at Loviisa and TVO facili-
ties. List of the methods is presented in Table V.
The characteristics of different measuring
equipment are described in more detail in various
technical reports. An overall view of STUK’s
measuring activities can be obtained from the16
Fig. 7. Setting up Spent Fuel Attribute Tester meas-
uring equipment in Loviisa nuclear power plant.reference (Honkamaa T, Hämäläinen M, How
STUK verifies Spent Fuel – And WHY? Proceed-
ings of ESARDA, 25th Annual Meeting, Stock-
holm, May 2003).
STUK made four measuring campaigns of
spent nuclear fuel in 2003. The campaigns are
listed in Table VI.
The number of measured assemblies is 425. In
addition, a few dummy elements were verified.
Also the IAEA made measurements with an IRAT
(Irradiated Fuel Attribute Tester) device in Lovii-
sa in September 2003, where about 30 assemblies
and dummies were measured (Fig. 8). No anoma-
lies were observed.Fig. 8. The IAEA inspectors are preparing the
Irradiated Fuel Attribute Tester measurements at
the Loviisa KPA store.
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5 Safeguards for final disposal
in geological repository5.1 Safeguards requirements
The final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in the
geological repository at Olkiluoto was accepted by
the local municipality and the state authorities,
and was finally endorsed by the Parliament of
Finland in 2001. The geological site investigations
will proceed to the underground phase in 2004
when the excavation of the tunnel system for bed-
rock characterisation at repository site begins.
The final disposal facility will consist of the sur-
face installations including the encapsulation
plant and the underground galleries. In general,
the sitting of these facilities at the territory of
Olkiluoto is not yet designed. Moreover, the plan
to construct an underground rock characterisa-
tion facility that includes a ramp, a tunnel and a
shaft (Fig. 9) is not subject to the Finnish Nuclear
Energy Act until it is evident and it has beenFig. 9. Generic plan for the underground disposal faci
tunnels in yellow and blue.accepted that spent fuel will be moved into these
tunnels. Nevertheless, the possibility to have this
underground space as a licensed part of the nu-
clear repository shall be considered already dur-
ing the construction phase. Referring to the rec-
ommendations generated in the IAEA´s Pro-
gramme for Development of Safeguards for Final
Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological Repositories
(SAGOR), the safeguards approach in the pre-
operational phase at Olkiluoto site is suggested.
At this pre-operational phase the main obligation
is the verification of the excavated rock space and
its geometrical volume. In addition, the interna-
tional community must be ensured about the ab-
sence of undeclared nuclear or other safeguards-
relevant activities at or near the repository al-
ready during the excavation of the investigatory
galleries.17
lities. The rock characterisation phase is shown as
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The plans to construct the underground facility
for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel signify
that the first safeguards measures, e.g. baseline
mapping of the site area, needs to be taken prior
to the excavation phase. In order to support the
development and implementation of the regulato-
ry control of the final disposal programme, STUK
established an independent national expert
group, LOSKA, in April 2002. The group supports
STUK in the development of the technical safe-
guards requirements, in the implementation of
the safeguards and in the evaluation of the facili-
ty operator plans. The group reviewed the IAEA
recommendations for safeguarding a geological re-
pository with the focus on the conditions at
Olkiluoto, located in a crystalline Precambrian
bedrock at the Latitude North of 61°15´ (Okko O18
Fig. 10. National expert group LOSKA is ensuring
feedback from relevant parties at the Rauma
Symposium in autumn 2003.(ed.), 2003, Safeguards for final disposal of spent
nuclear fuel. Methods and technologies for the
Olkiluoto site, STUK-YTO-TR 199). In addition,
the group collected baseline data for safeguards
purposes using geophysical, i.e. passive seismic
techniques and satellite imagery during 2003.
This work is scheduled to continue in 2004 to
evaluate the methods for their relevance concern-
ing the safeguards.
5.3 International co-operation
Owing to the present conditions and development
with the Olkiluoto repository, STUK invited the
IAEA and its Expert Group on Geological Reposi-
tories to visit the Olkiluoto geographical site and
provided an opportunity to get acquainted with
site specific information during the one-week
symposium held at Rauma on Sept 29 – Oct 4,
2003. During the symposium, baseline material
collected by the national LOSKA Group and other
institutions involved in the environmental moni-
toring at Olkiluoto was discussed (Fig. 10). Later,
on November 18, Jukka Laaksonen, Director Gen-
eral of STUK, invited officially the IAEA, with a
copy to the Euratom, to start negotiations con-
cerning the implementation of safeguards meas-
ures during the pre-operational phase of the final
repository. Attached to this official letter, an ini-
tial set of pertinent information was provided to
the IAEA. This initiative is expected to result in a
cooperation through which efficient safeguards
can be ensured during the construction and oper-
ation of the repository.
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6 Transport of radioactive and
nuclear materials
Fig. 11. Loading of fresh fuel packages from train
onto a truck for transport to power plant.Transport of nuclear material is subject to trans-
port licence as stipulated in the Nuclear Energy
Act. This licence for nuclear facilities is usually
granted for a longer period and that is why no
new transport licences were granted in 2003. For
each transport, there must be a transport plan
approved by STUK. Also a physical protection
plan and a certificate of nuclear liability insur-
ance are required either separately or in connec-
tion with the transport plan. Before a package
can be used for fissile material transport, the
package design must be approved by STUK.
In 2003, fresh nuclear fuel was transported
into Finland from Spain, Germany, Sweden and
Russia. The western fuel was transported on
trucks or trailers which are shipped by sea to a
Finnish harbour and driven by road to the power
plant. The Russian fuel was transported by rail
over the border to Vainikkala station, where it
was loaded onto trucks and driven to Loviisa
power plant (Fig. 11). In addition one irradiated
fuel rod was transported to Sweden by road for
inspection.In 2003 STUK approved three package designs
by validation of a foreign certificate. Four trans-
port plans for import or export of nuclear fuel
were approved. In addition, three package de-
signs were validated for transit shipments.19
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7 Preventing illicit trafficking
Year Number of denied shipments
1996 18
1997 23
1998 9
1999 7
2000 2
2001 0
2002 0
2003 0
Table VII. Number of shipments for which entry
into Finland was denied due to undeclared radio-
activity.Import and export of radioactive and nuclear ma-
terial is subject to licence. STUK works in close
cooperation with the Finnish Customs in order to
prevent illegal import of radioactive and nuclear
material into Finland. In 2003 there was no such
case (Table VII). The cooperation is also extended
to border officers of neighbouring countries and
STUK organised two training courses for Baltic
border officers in border control of radioactive ma-
t e r i a l s .
STUK will continue to participate in the inter-
national work in preventing nuclear terrorism
and illicit trafficking of radioactive and nuclear
material. In 2003 STUK participated in meetings
arranged by the IAEA, EU or ITWG (Internation-
al Technical Working Group of Nuclear Smug-
gling) dealing with technical means to detect20illicit trafficking, organisational preparedness for
operations in real case, exchange of information,
etc.
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8 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT)The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT) is an important part of the international
regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons. It bans totally any nuclear weapon test ex-
plosions in any environment. This ban is aimed at
constraining the development and qualitative im-
provement of nuclear weapons, including also the
development of advanced new types of nuclear
weapons.
The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly, and was opened for signature
in New York on September 24, 1996. The Treaty
will enter into force after it has been ratified by
the 44 states listed in its Annex 2. These 44 states
participated in the 1996 session of the Conference
on Disarmament, and possess nuclear power or
research reactors.
A global verification regime is being estab-
lished in order to monitor compliance with the
CTBT. The verification regime consists of the
following elements: International Monitoring Sys-
tem (IMS), consultation and clarification process,
On-Site inspections (OSI) and confidence-building
measures.
Finland has signed and ratified the CTBT. In
addition to complying with the basic requirement
of the Treaty not to carry out any nuclear weapon
tests, Finland takes part in the international
monitoring network aimed at verifying more glo-
bal compliance with the obligations of the Treaty.In the CTBT framework, the National Authori-
ty is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. STUK has
two roles: STUK operates both the National Data
Centre and the radionuclide laboratory. The main
tasks of the National Data Centre are to monitor
data received from the international monitoring
system and to inform the National Authority
about its monitoring results. The radionuclide
laboratory serves the International Monitoring
System by providing support in the radionuclide
analyses and in the quality control of functions.
Other national collaborators are the Institute of
Seismology and the Ministry of Defence.
During 2003 the National Data Centre partici-
pated in the meetings of the work group of the
Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organiza-
tion. The task of the working group is to deal with
the examination and development of the verifica-
tion issues. In the framework of the bilateral
support for the Baltic States, the National Data
Centre provided training and technical support
for the establishment of a functional National
Data Centres of Estonia and Lithuania.
The National Data Centre continued develop-
ing its own routine monitoring system for the
data received from the international verification
regime. To improve the usability of the monitor-
ing results, a database was developed and taken
into everyday operation. During 2003 no anoma-
lies were observed among the monitoring results.21
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9 International safeguards
cooperation
Finland is committed in the non-proliferation of nuclear
materials and supports actively strengthening and developing
of the international safeguards related to the Non-proliferation
Treaty (NPT).9.1 The IAEA Fellowship visitor
The IAEA fellowship visitor, Mr Zulkefle Hussin,
was working six weeks at STUK’s Nuclear Mate-
rials Regulation section. For the meantime Mr
Hussin is working in a Nuclear Installation Divi-
sion of AELB in Malaysia. The aim of the fellow-
ship visit was to study and familiarize the regula-
tions, safety standards and procedures which
have been implemented on radiation and nuclear
activities in Finland.
9.2 Safeguards cooperation
in the neighbour areas
The primary objective is to enhance security in
Finland’s neighbouring areas. Accordingly Fin-
land has established a bilateral safeguards sup-
port programme for the Baltic States and a coop-
eration programme with the Russian Federation.
The aim of the support and cooperation is to as-
sist these countries in establishing, enhancing
and maintaining a national system of nuclear ma-22
Fig. 12. During October 6 – November 14, 2003
Zulkefle Hussin (second from the right) was
working as an IAEA fellowship visitor in the
Nuclear Materials Regulation at STUK.terial control covering also physical protection, ex-
port/import and border control issues. These pro-
grammes are funded by the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs of Finland. In 2003 the total funds allocat-
ed for these programmes were 200 000 Euros. Im-
plementation of the support projects is carried out
by STUK in co-operation with the Finnish nuclear
facilities and other expert organisations. All the
projects are implemented on a bilateral basis be-
tween respective authorities and experts from the
participating countries and Finland taking into
account international coordination and co-opera-
tion with other countries involved, the European
Commission and the IAEA. See also the report
Finnish Support Programme for Nuclear Safety,
Progress Report Annual Summary 2003.
9.3 Finnish support programme to the
IAEA safeguards
Finnish Safeguards Support Programme to the
IAEA was started in 1988. Since the beginning,
the programme has been implemented under the
coordination of STUK in close cooperation with
the Finnish nuclear facilities and other expert or-
ganisations in Finland. It has also taken into ac-
count the other IAEA Member States’ support pro-
grammes. In 2003 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
allocated 300 000 Euros for the programme. The
main areas of support in 2003 consisted of the
development and testing of instruments and
methods related to nuclear material verification,
initiation of the development of a new IAEA train-
ing course concerning implementation of the Ad-
ditional Protocol, training of the IAEA inspectors
in using verification instruments, cost-free expert
support and a project related to the final disposal
of spent fuel.
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Body of ESARDA Member
Steering Committee Arja Tanninen
Executive Board Elina Martikka
Scientific Committee and Co-ordination Board Tapani Honkamaa
Non-Destructive Assay Working Group Marko Hämäläinen
Containment and Surveillance Working Group Tapani Honkamaa
Integrated Safeguards Working Group Olli Okko and Elina Martikka
Verification Technologies Working Group Juha Rautjärvi
Back end of Fuel Cycle Käthe Sarparanta, TVO
Table VIII. Finnish representatives in ESARDA organs.9.3 Activities in ESARDA
STUK is a member of the European Safeguards
Research and Development Association (ES-
ARDA), and has nominated Finnish experts to allcommittees and most of the working groups (see
Table VIII). In addition, STUK took actively part
in the Stockholm symposium in May 2003. STUK
chaired two sessions and had three presentations.23
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10 Historical survey on Finnish nuclear
non-proliferation policy during the Cold WarMr Arno Ahosniemi from University Helsinki, De-
partment of Social Science History, Political His-
tory unit made a survey on Finnish non-prolifera-
tion policy during the Cold War. He tried to find
out what did the Finns know about nuclear weap-
ons and how the Finnish Non-Proliferation Policy
during the Cold War was linked to broader con-
text of the Finnish foreign and security policy.
The survey has been published only in Finnish
(Ahosniemi Arno, 2004, Jotta Suomessa voitaisiin
huoletta kulkea, Ydinaseiden ja ydinpolttoainek-
ysymysten seuranta Suomessa kylmän sodan
aikana, STUK-YTO-TR 201). The résumé of the
survey describes the situation as follows:
It is clear that nuclear bombs dropped by the
United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
summer 1945 revolutionised international securi-
ty. The nuclear arms race started and the nuclear
weapons became the symbol of the whole Cold
War era and the horror picture of the total
destruction.
Nuclear disarmament was put on the agenda
of the established United Nations and the UN
Atomic Energy Commission. It soon became clear
that the goal of the UNAEC was unattainable.
The Soviet Union, in 1949, and United Kingdom,
in 1952, were able to achieve the status of the
nuclear weapon state on their own. Also Sweden
was engaged in activites aimed at nuclear weapon
capability. In general, the beginning of 1950s´ was
very problematic concerning nuclear non-prolifer-
ation. In the end of 1953, the U.S. decided to use
co-operation as a nuclear non-proliferation tool.
The “Atoms for Peace” initiative of President
Eisenhower offered assistance to countries will-
ing to accept international control of their nuclear
activities for peaceful use of nuclear energy. But
the question was not that simple. Many countries,
including Finland, did not want to place the
development of their atomic energy and military
research into the hands of foreign states.
However, one consequence of the Atoms for
Peace initiative was the establishment of the24IAEA in 1957. The aim of the IAEA was to control
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, components
of nuclear devices and other nuclear material.
Despite the “The First Détente” – era in the
superpower relations after the death of Soviet
leader Josef Stalin in 1953 – the negotiations and
discussions regarding nuclear disarmament and
arms control continued to be unsuccessful in the
1950s. This decade is particularly interesting from
the point of view of our research about the
Finnish Nuclear Non-Proliferation policy. The
shaping of the Finnish domestic and foreign poli-
cy was still going on after the difficult years after
the Second World War. At this point most of the
foreign countries were not very determined about
the side of the iron curtain that Finland stood on.
When the status of Finland in the world politics
was not very clear, the Finnish political leader-
ship had to be very cautious about developments
in the superpower relations. They had to be
extremely sensitive to what was going on in the
Soviet Union. The memories of the war and the
so-called years of danger (1945-1948) were still
very vivid. The research and development, during
these early decades, were guided by consideration
that had to take into account the following basic
conditions: The 1947 Paris Peace Treaty stipulat-
ed that Finland shall not possess nuclear weap-
ons. There was a real concern about the safety of
the people in case of detonation of nuclear weap-
ons in Finland, were it caused by accidental or
intended action. Finland did not want to see a
condition developing that the Soviet Union refers
to the pact about cooperation and mutual assist-
ance and offers its assistance to Finland in the
area of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful or
military purposes. Finland was also interested to
play an active role in the nuclear disarmament
process. In short, Finland aquired level knowl-
edge about nuclear weapons that was considered
necessary for security and was understood to
support also the Finnish role in the disarmament
discussion.
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11 ConclusionsAll the actions including nuclear materials and
other nuclear items were carried out according to
the Finnish nuclear legislation and regulations.
Also the requirements of the international agree-ments have been fulfilled. Based on results of
STUK’s regulation it is possible to conclude that
the nuclear materials and other nuclear items
were used for intended, peaceful, use.25
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ANNEX 1 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTSA list of valid legislation, treaties and agreements
concerning safeguards of nuclear materials at the
end of 2003 in Finland (reference to Finnish Trea-
ty Series, FTS)
1. Nuclear Energy Act, 11 December, 1987/990
as amended.
2. Nuclear Energy Decree, 12 February, 1988/
161 as amended.
3. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons INFCIRC/140 (FTS 11/70).
4. The Agreement with the Kingdom of Belgium,
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic,
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the King-
dom of Netherlands, the European Atomic
Energy Community and the International
Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of
Article iii, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/
193), 14 September 1997. Valid for Finland
from 4 October 1995.
5. The Treaty establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), 25
March 1957:
• Regulation No 5, amendment of the list in
Attachment VI, 22 December 1958
• Regulation No 9, article 197, point 4 of the
Euratom Treaty, on determining con-cent-
rations of ores, 2 February 1960.266. Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 3227/
76, 19 October 1976 and Amendments:
• Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 220/
90, 26 January 1990 (a new inventory chan-
ge code, MP)
• Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 2130/
93, 27 July 27 1993 (basic technical charac-
teristics for new facilities and reporting
from Euratom to IAEA).
7. Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting
up a Community regime for the control of
Exports of dual-use items and technology as
amended.
8. The Agreement with the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Nort-
hern Ireland and the Government of the
Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (FTS 16/69).
9. The Agreement with the Government of the
Russian Federation (the Soviet Union signed)
and the Government of the Republic of Fin-
land for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy (FTS 39/69).
10. The Agreement between the Government of
the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government
of the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in
the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. 580/70
(FTS 41/70).
11. The Agreement between Sweden and Finland
concerning guidelines on export of nuclear
materials, technology and equipment (FTS 20/
83).
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Republic of Finland and the Government of
Canada and Canada concerning the uses of
nuclear materials, equipment, facilities and
information transferred between Finland and
Canada (FTS 43/76). Substituted to the ap-
propriate extent by the Agreement with the
Government of Canada and the European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in the
peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 6 October
1959 as amended.
13. The Agreement on implementation of the Ag-
reement with Finland and Canada concerning
the uses of nuclear materials, equipment,
facilities and information transferred between
Finland and Canada (FTS 43/84).14. The Agreement between the Government of
Republic of Finland and the Government of
Australia concerning the transfer of nuclear
material between Finland and Australia (FTS
2/80). Substituted to the appropriate extent
by the Agreement between the Government of
Australia and the European Atomic Energy
Community concerning transfer of nuclear
material from Australia to the European Ato-
mic Energy Community.
15. The Agreement for Cooperation with the Go-
vernment of the Republic of Finland and the
Government of the United States concerning
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (FTS 37/92).
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy with European Ato-
mic Energy Community and the USA.27
28
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ANNEX 2 IAEA, ES AND STUK INSPECTIONS IN 2003
General information Inspections Inspection man-days
MBA Date Inspection type IAEA ES STUK IAEA ES STUK
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 14–15 Jan. Routine inspection 3 3 3 3 6 3
WL0V 14 Jan. FA inspection 1 1
WL0V 16 Jan. Routine inspection 1 1 1 1 2 1
WL0V 21 Jan. FA inspection 1 1
WL0V 27 Feb. Other nuclear items 1 2
WL0V 6 March FA inspection 1 1
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 1–2 April Routine inspection 3 3 3 3 6 3
WL0V 3 April Routine inspection 1 1 1 1 2 1
WL0V 15–16 April STUK SFAT 1 4
W0L2 23–24 May PIV 1 1 1 2 2 2
W0L1 2–3 June PIV 1 1 1 2 2 4
WL0V 2 June Spent fuel rods 
(to be exported to Sweden)
1 1
WRRF 5 June PIV 1 1 1 1 1 2
W0LS 23–25 June STUK GBUV 1 6
WL0V 8 July Routine inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 10–11 July Routine inspection 3 3 3 3 3 3
WKK0 15 July STUK system inspection 1 1
WL0V 10 Aug. Loviisa 1 core verification 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 30 Aug. Loviisa 2 core verification 
+ PIV
1 1 1 1 1 1
WFRS 3 Sep. PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
WHEL 3 Sep. PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
WKK0 4 Sep. PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0LS 8–10 Sep. STUK SFAT + PIV 1 1 2 1 1 6
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 22–23 Sep. Routine inspection 3 3 3 3 3 3
WL0V 25 Sep. Routine inspection 
(+ IAEA/ES IRAT)
1 1 1 3 1 2
WL0V 3–5 Dec. STUK FORK 1 6
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 9–10 Dec. Routine inspection 3 3 3 6 3 3
WL0V 12 Dec. Routine inspection 1 1 1 2 1 1
TOTAL 29 29 39 37 39 63
Note: In Olkiluoto, inspections are counted per MBA. FA = Fuel Assembly, PIV = Physical Inventory Verification
